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Introduction
The enforcement of rules is central to the operation of all societies and organizations.
Observers who are angered by rule violations and punish the violators often play a critical role in enforcement. That punishment may be as simple as reporting o¤enses to authorities. Enforcement may be di¢cult, however, if observers excuse noncompliance. The question arises: when will noncompliance provoke anger and punishment, and when will it be excused? This paper builds a theory of rule compliance, non-compliance, anger, and punishment.
The theory considers anger as a possible outcome in a two-person, sequential-move game.
The …rst player decides whether to comply with a rule, at a cost; the second player decides how much to punish him for any noncompliance, at a cost. There are two non-standard ingredients: (1) the …rst player could be of two types, one of which has a "sense of duty" to comply with the rule; and (2) the second player could be of two types, one of which holds that the …rst player has a duty to comply with the rule (or, put di¤erently, de…nes a "reasonable" …rst player as one possessing a sense of duty). We critically assume that the second player is only angered by noncompliance if she thinks a "reasonable" …rst player would have complied in similar circumstances. Otherwise, noncompliance is excused.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple conceptual framework that captures important phenomena and a variety of observed behaviors not previously explained by a single model. The two-agent, two-period model presented here can be adapted to more complex environments. Concepts taken as exogenous -such as players' views regarding duty -can also be endogenized.
The model's description of what is excusable exactly parallels the standard understanding of an excuse in the law. According to the "reasonable person test," which is widely applied in both tort law and criminal law, "Negligence arises from doing an act that a reasonable person would not do under the circumstances, or from failing to do an act that a reasonable person would do." 1 2
The model provides insight as to when noncompliance provokes anger. For example, anger-over-noncompliance depends upon the cost of compliance. Noncompliance is excused when the cost of compliance is high (since a reasonable person would not be expected to comply) and it provokes anger when the cost of compliance is low (since a reasonable person would be expected to comply). This result is consistent with survey evidence from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) . They found, for example, that 68 percent of survey respondents excused a company for reducing wages when it was losing money; and 75 percent excused a landlord for raising the rent on a property when the landlord's costs increased, even though increasing the rent meant the current tenant would be forced to move. 3 For intermediate values of the cost of compliance, there are multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, there is a high probability of noncompliance and noncompliance is excused; in the other, there is a low probability of noncompliance and noncompliance provokes anger.
This result is consistent with the empirical …nding that a high rate of noncompliance serves as an excuse for noncompliance. 4 Anger-over-noncompliance also depends upon whether the second player holds that there is a duty to comply (since the second player's view regarding duty determines how a "reasonable person" is de…ned). In particular, if the second player feels that the …rst player has no duty to comply (feels that the …rst player is entitled to do what he wants), she excuses noncompliance. In line with this result are the outcomes of ultimatum games where the experimenters have manipulated player 2 to think that player 1 is entitled to decide the 1 Miller and Perry (2012) , p. 2. 2 According to Unikel (1992) : "From its modest beginnings, 'reasonableness' has gained a prominent position in almost every area of American law. A general survey reveals that the concept of 'reasonableness' is a standard of decision making in administrative law, bailment law, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law, tort law, and the law of trusts. " (p. 327) 3 A high cost of compliance is similarly seen as a valid excuse in courts of law, for which there are many legal precedents. The case of United States v. Carroll Towing Company is an important precedent in the use of the reasonable person test. The case concerned a barge that broke adrift, collided with a tanker, and sank. In assessing whether there was negligence on the part of the barge owner, Judge Learned Hand tried to determine what a reasonable person would have done. He decided, in particular, that what a reasonable person would be expected to do depended upon the cost of taking precautions. 4 In surveys on corruption, for example, Rose-Ackerman (2001) …nds that people justify their own corrupt behavior by citing its pervasiveness. division of the pot. Such manipulation makes player 2 less likely to reject low o¤ers by player 1. 5 When the second player does not know the …rst player's cost of compliance, her angerover-noncompliance will depend upon her prior beliefs about the …rst player's type. The second player will be less angry over noncompliance when she is more convinced that the …rst player feels a duty to comply. The reason is as follows. Upon observing noncompliance, player 2 is uncertain whether there is a good excuse (the cost of compliance is high) or player 1 is just unreasonable. Player 2's prior on player 1's type a¤ects the weight she puts on there being a good excuse. This result explains the empirical …nding that anger escalates with repeated noncompliance (since repeated noncompliance is likely to signal that a person lacks a sense of duty). 6 The model not only gives insight as to when noncompliance provokes anger; perhaps more importantly, it sheds light on when rules will be enforceable. One of the factors that a¤ect rule enforceability in the model is brand new: the role of duty. A rule cannot be enforced when neither the …rst nor the second player feels there is a duty to comply: if the …rst player lacks a sense of duty to comply, he complies only to avoid punishment; if the second player feels there is no duty to comply, she excuses noncompliance and hence in ‡icts no punishment. This …nding relates to a large body of work outside of economics, on "legitimacy." By common de…nition, a rule is "legitimate" if there is a widespread feeling that there is a duty to comply. Complete lack of legitimacy thus corresponds to the case in the model where neither player feels there is a duty to comply. Blau (1964) argues that rules will be disobeyed in the absence of legitimacy because "coercive use of power engenders resistance." 7 That resistance, according to Ostrom (1990) , is commonly manifested in reluctance to report violations to authorities. Violations are not reported 5 Most ultimatum game experiments randomly assign the …rst-player role. According to Güth (1995) , "Participants who received their position in such a way may not feel entitled to exploit its strategic possibilities." (p. 331) Güth and Tietz (1985) , in contrast, auction o¤ the …rst-player role. Similarly, in Ho¤man, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) , the …rst-player role is earned through a high score on a general knowledge quiz. Both experiments …nd that, relative to random assignment, …rst players make less generous o¤ers and second players are less likely to reject low o¤ers.
6 See the discussion of Kliemann, Young, Scholz, and Saxe (2008) in Section 5. 7 Blau (1964), pp. 199-200. because they are excused. In consequence, "the legitimacy of rules. . . will reduce the costs of monitoring, and [its] absence will increase [the] costs." 8
The importance of legitimacy of rules for enforcement is thus one important phenomenon captured by the model. We will consider a number of examples where enforcement problems arise from lack of legitimacy. They suggest that the need to legitimate rules serves as a constraint; this constraint often has large e¤ects on the way in which organizations are structured.
The model accounts for a second signi…cant enforcement problem. Enforcement is di¢cult when rule-breaking is common. Collier (2000) has argued, for instance, that when corruption is pervasive, laws against it are di¢cult to enforce: observers excuse it and, thus, fail to report it to authorities. The result is a "corruption trap": where corruption begets corruption. Corruption traps are a particular problem for underdeveloped countries.
Other traps -such as the persistence and toleration of tax avoidance, teacher/health-worker absenteeism, and unpunctuality -are also rife in underdeveloped countries. The possibility of multiple equilibria in the model accounts for the existence of such noncompliance traps; as we will see later, the model additionally explains why underdeveloped countries are particularly prone to them.
We will also examine two phenomena explained by the paper's theory of anger. There is typically a high degree of tolerance of self-interested behavior in markets. Sen (1977) has seen this as a puzzle, given people's strong concerns for fairness. The model accounts both for the high tolerance of self-interested behavior in markets and also for the exceptions to such tolerance. In addition, as previously noted, the model gives an explanation why rule violators provoke more anger and receive harsher punishment with repeat o¤ense.
Relation to Existing Literature. The paper contributes to the economic literature on norms. While there are several perspectives on norms, a prominent strain regards them as internalized conceptions of duty or obligation. According to this view, people obey norms out of a desire to do their duty (see, for example, Elster (1989) , Besley and Ghatak (2005) , 8 Ostrom (1990) , p. 204. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) , Prendergast (2007 Prendergast ( , 2008 , and Benabou and Tirole (2011) ). 9 10
But, it has also been recognized that norm violations are often punished (see Sugden (1986) and Coleman (1990) ). 11 Fear of punishment may also induce obedience. 12 How do these sanctions come about? This paper explains how views regarding duty can give rise to sanctions: a player's feeling that there is a duty to comply not only motivates compliance, it potentially motivates punishment of others' noncompliance. Norm violations sometimes provoke anger and punishment in the model, but, on the other hand, they may be excused.
The paper further explains when noncompliance will and will not be punished. Moreover, it describes when those who lack a sense of duty (have failed to internalize the norm) may nonetheless comply in order to avoid such sanctions.
The paper also contributes to the literature on rule enforcement. As previously mentioned, the model is unique in identifying "legitimacy" of rules as a determinant of enforceability. 13 Other factors that a¤ect enforceability, while present in existing models, appear here in non-standard ways. For example, a higher cost of compliance makes a rule harder to enforce both for the standard reason (the greater temptation for player 1 to break the rule), and for an additional reason (the greater willingness of player 2 to excuse noncompliance).
Another important contribution of the paper is to the theory of third-party enforcement. It argues that the probability of catching rule violations will normally be related to observers'
anger-over-noncompliance; in providing a theory of the determinants of anger, the paper yields new ways in which to endogenize the chance of catching violators.
The conclusion additionally discusses the implications for organization theory and the relation to existing work on the theory of fairness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a simple example. Section 3 describes 9 Some of these papers use di¤erent terminology, such as "intrinsic motivation" or "values." 1 0 For a survey of approaches to norms, see . 1 1 There is considerable experimental evidence demonstrating people's willingness to in ‡ict costly punishment when norms are violated (see, for example, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter (2002) ).
1 2 lists two additional reasons why people may comply with norms. They may do so in order to coordinate with others (see Young (1993 Young ( ,1996 ). They may also obey in order to avoid social stigma (see Bernheim (1994) , Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) , and Benabou and Tirole (2011) ).
1 3 The standard approaches to rule enforcement are repeated-game models (for example, Kandori (1992) ) and third-party enforcement models (see especially Becker (1968) ). None of these models have described the role of legitimacy. the formal model. Section 4 solves for the equilibria of the game. Section 5 discusses four phenomena explained by the model: the role of "legitimacy" in enforcement, noncompliance traps, tolerance of self-interestedness in markets, and graduated sanctions for repeat o¤enders. Section 6 concludes.
An Illustrative Example
The key aspects of the theory can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider a game with two players: 1 and 2. Player 1 is of type 1 2 f0 1g. 1 = 1 with probability and 1 = 0 with probability 1 ¡ , with
1. An 1 = 0 type has instrumental preferences, whereas an 1 = 1 type feels some sense of duty to comply with a rule. Player 1 knows his type but player 2 does not know player 1's type.
At time 1, player 1 chooses whether to comply with the rule ( = 1), or not ( = 0).
The cost of complying is 0. An 1 = 1 type also faces a cost 0 if he fails to comply, re ‡ecting his sense of duty to do so. 14 Compliance is valued by player 2 in amount .
In the event of noncompliance, player 2 decides at time 2 how much to punish player 1: ¸0. We assume player 2's preferences are such that she chooses = (for a more detailed discussion of player 2's preferences, see the next section). denotes player 2's ability to punish. denotes player 2's feeling of mistreatment. is de…ned as how much worse o¤ player 2 is than she would be had player 1 been a "reasonable person." We assume player 2 de…nes a reasonable person as someone with a sense of duty to comply (an 1 = 1 type). 15 Let denote the compliance choice of a reasonable ( 1 = 1) type. If a reasonable person would have complied ( = 1) but player 1 fails to comply ( = 0),
The equilibrium concept we will apply is formally described in Section 3. For the 1 4 While we assume for the purpose of simplicity that player 1 loses regardless of the cost of compliance , the model can easily be generalized so that is a function of . This accounts for circumstances in which a dutiful type only feels a duty to comply when it is not too costly to do so. 
In the equilibrium with punishment, the 1 = 1 type complies and, if · , the 1 = 0 type also complies. The 1 = 0 type, who is instrumental, complies purely in order to avoid punishment . In the equilibrium with no punishment, neither the 1 = 1 type nor the 1 = 0 type complies.
Observe that the types of equilibria that arise depend upon whether the cost of compliance is low ( · ), intermediate ( · + ), or high ( + ). When the cost of compliance is relatively low ( · ), there is a unique equilibrium in which noncompliance is punished ( ¤ = ). Reasonable people comply even if noncompliance is not punished, so player 2 is necessarily angered by noncompliance.
When the cost of compliance is relatively high ( + ), there is a unique equilibrium in which noncompliance is not punished ( ¤ = 0). The cost of compliance is su¢ciently high that a reasonable person cannot be induced to comply. Player 2 excuses noncompliance 1 6 Condition (1) corresponds to the standard rationality assumption for player 1 in a Bayesian game. Condition (2) encompasses assumptions about both the on-and o¤-equilibrium-path behavior of player 2.
Our focus in Section 3 will be on perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). Condition (2) corresponds to a re…nement of PBE, which we refer to as Reasonable-Person (RP) Stability. See the Appendix for a discussion.
The set of PBE and the set of RP-stable PBE look very similar. They generate exactly the same compliance behavior but PBE admits a larger set of possible punishments of noncompliance.
In the present example, there is a unique RP-stable PBE of type 1A (see Figure 1) , in which both the type only or by both types) and punishment of noncompliance. The reason for multiple equilibria is as follows. In the …rst type of equilibrium, reasonable people fail to comply ( = 0). As a result, player 2 excuses noncompliance and fails to punish it ( = 0). The lack of punishment makes it optimal for reasonable people to choose noncompliance. In the second type of equilibrium, reasonable people comply ( = 1). As a result, there is considerable anger over (and punishment of) noncompliance ( = ). This punishment is su¢cient to induce compliance from reasonable people. This example demonstrates important features of the theory. First, anger-over-noncompliance depends upon the cost of compliance. Noncompliance is excused when the cost of compliance is high. There are multiple equilibria when the cost of compliance takes an intermediate value. Second, we see that player 2's de…nition of reasonableness -whether player 2 feels there is a duty to comply (as we have assumed here) or not -matters for what will be excused.
In this example, player 2's anger over (and punishment of) noncompliance did not depend upon her prior regarding player 1's type ( ). In contrast, player 2's prior does play a role when player 1 does not know player 2's cost of compliance ( ). Upon observing noncompliance, player 2 may be uncertain whether player 1 had a good excuse ( was high) or was just unreasonable. Player 2's prior about player 1's type ( ) will a¤ect how much weight player 2 puts on player 1 being unreasonable.
The Model
We turn now to the formal model. We will consider a two-period Bayesian game with two players: 1 and 2. Player 1 is of type 1 2 f0 1g, where 1 = 0 re ‡ects a player with instrumental preferences and 1 = 1 re ‡ects a player with a sense of duty to follow a rule.
Player 1 knows his own type ( 1 ) and the cost of compliance ( ). Player 2 does not know 1 or . Player 2's prior on 1 is that 1 = 1 with probability and 1 = 0 with probability 1 ¡ , with 1. Player 2's prior on is that it is drawn from a distribution with cdf and support µ (0 1). 1 and are assumed to be independent. Let ( 1 ) denote player 2's joint prior on 1 and .
Player 2 also has a type 2 2 f0 1g. For simplicity, we assume 2 is common knowledge. 18 If 2 = 1, player 2 feels there is a duty to comply. If 2 = 0, player 2 feels there is no duty (player 2 feels player 1 is entitled to do what he wants). 2 describes how player 2 de…nes a reasonable person. Player 2 de…nes a reasonable person as an 1 = 2 type. 19 At time 1, player 1 chooses whether to comply with a rule ( 2 f0 1g). We will refer to = 1 as "compliance" and = 0 as "noncompliance." Player 2 observes player 1's choice.
If player 1 fails to comply, player 2 chooses how much to punish player 1 at time 2: ¸0. 20 We restrict attention to pure strategies for the players. A strategy for player 1 is a function~ ( 1 ).~ ( 1 ) denotes player 1's choice of given and 1 . A strategy 1 8 Equilibria look very similar whether 2 is known by player 1 or not; the assumption that 2 is known considerably simpli…es the analysis.
1 9 We might have chosen, alternatively, to describe a person as "reasonable" whenever 1¸ 2. While we de…ne a reasonable person as an 1 = 2 type, we will see that the model implies that, whenever player 2 excuses the behavior of an 1 = 2 type, she will also excuse the behavior of an 1 2 type. 2 0 An alternative game where player 2 can punish player 1 after = 1 would require a more elaborate equilibrium concept such as sequential equilibrium but would yield qualitatively similar results. for player 2 is~ , which denotes player 2's choice of how much to punish noncompliance.
(While player 2 also has a type 2 , 2 can simply be treated as an exogenous parameter of the model. So, we choose not to write player 2's strategy as a function of her type.)
If player 1 chooses action and player 2 follows strategy~ , player 1's utility is given by:
The …rst term is the punishment player 2 in ‡icts on player 1. The second term is the cost incurred if player 1 complies. The third term is the loss of utility to player 1 from failing to do her duty. It is equal to zero unless player 1 feels he has a duty to comply and fails to do so ( 1 = 1 and = 0), in which case it is equal to 0. 21 The …rst two terms of the utility function are the economic part of player 1's utility function, re ‡ecting what player 1
wants to do, while the third term re ‡ects what player 1 feels he should do.
Before de…ning player 2's utility function, it is …rst necessary to de…ne mistreatment ( ). In line with our previous discussion, we de…ne mistreatment as how much better o¤ player 2 would be if player 1 had been a reasonable person (had possessed an appropriate sense of duty). More formally, when player 1 plays strategy~ :
¸0 is how much player 2 values compliance. 22~ ( ) denotes the strategy followed by a reasonable person. Since a reasonable person is de…ned as an 1 = 2 type,~ ( ) = ( 2 ). ¢~ ( ) is what player 2 would receive from player 1 if player 1 were reasonable.
2 1 As mentioned earlier, we assume player 1 loses regardless of the cost of compliance for simplicity. The model can be generalized so that is a function of in order to account for circumstances in which a dutiful type only feels a duty to comply when it is not too costly to do so.
The duty term could also be generalized in other ways. We can capture more sophisticated rules -such as, for example, a duty to adhere to orders given by a leader -by allowing duty to depend upon the state of the world (in this case, the order given by the leader).
¢~ (
1 ) is what player 2 actually receives from player 1. 23 According to this formula, player 2 only feels mistreated when a reasonable person would comply (~ ( ) = 1) but player 1 fails to comply (~ ( 1 ) = 0), in which case = . Otherwise, = 0.
If player 2 chooses to punish noncompliance in amount , her utility is given by:
The …rst term is the bene…t player 2 receives when player 1 complies. The second term is the cost of in ‡icting punishment on player 1, where ( ) is the cost of in ‡icting punishment
. The …nal term motivates player 2 to punish player 1 when she feels mistreated ( 0).
© represents the disutility associated with feeling mistreated; this disutility is reduced by punishing player 1.
For the remainder of the paper, we will use the following functional forms for and ©: 24
0 parameterizes the ability to punish player 1 (higher implies a greater ability to punish). Observe that the presence of a higher authority to which rule violations can be reported would serve to increase . In order to ensure that player 2's utility is decreasing in the mistreatment she su¤ers, we assume ¡1 . Figure 2 illustrates the game tree for the case where takes a single value. Observe that player 2's payo¤ at each node depends upon player 1's choice of strategy (~ ). While we typically do not see Bayesian games with this property, it is still a standard Bayesian 2 3 As mentioned in the introduction, this de…nition of mistreatment exactly corresponds to the "reasonable person test," which is widely used in contract law, criminal law, and tort law (among other branches) to assess liability or guilt.
2 4 These functional forms are convenient because they make it optimal for player 2 to choose = (or = ¢ ( ) when is unknown). The choice of functional forms is not critical however. What matters is that the functional forms for and © ensure that: player 2 punishes player 1 more when is greater and when player 2's cost of punishment is lower. log is technically unde…ned when = 0. We will assume ©(0 ) = lim !0 + log = 0.
game and standard equilibrium concepts can be applied.
Figure 2: The game tree for the case where takes a single value.
We will focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. For the sake of simplifying analysis, we assume in the equilibrium de…nition that player 1 chooses to comply if he is otherwise indi¤erent. Equilibria in the stylized version of the model presented in Section 2 correspond to a re…nement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For a detailed discussion, see the Appendix.
The equilibrium de…nition, stated below, has three conditions. Condition D1 says that player 1 maximizes utility, taking into account player 2's punishment strategy (choosing compliance if indi¤erent). Condition D2 says that player 2 maximizes expected utility given her posterior beliefs (¢j ). Condition D3 says that player 2 updates her beliefs according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. If player 1 chooses with zero probability, so that Bayes' rule is unde…ned, any posterior beliefs are then admissible.
Characterizing the equilibria Our assumptions on player 1's utility allow us to restate condition D1 as follows:
If player 1 has instrumental preferences ( 1 = 0), player 1 complies when the punishment of noncompliance is greater than or equal to the cost of compliance: ·~ ¤ . Player 1 is more compliant if he feels a sense of duty to comply: player 1 complies if ·~ ¤ + .
Our assumptions on player 2's utility function allow us to restate condition D2 as follows:
Player 2's punishment of noncompliance is increasing in her ability to punish ( ) and her expectation of how much she has been mistreated ( ).
First, consider the case where player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0). When
for all values of and 1 . 25 Intuitively, player 2 cannot feel mistreated when 2 = 0 since player 1 is always at least as compliant as a reasonable person. Hence, condition (*) implies that noncompliance is excused (~ ¤ = 0) when player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0). Now, consider the case where player 2 feels there is a duty to comply ( 2 = 1). When 2 5 The mathematical reasoning is as follows. Recall that (~
Bayes' rule is applicable, condition (*) implies that:
where is player 2's prior on the distribution of and is player 2's prior on the probability that player 1 is of type 1 = 1. It can be shown that Bayes' rule is applicable whenever
When (~ ¤ ) = 1, Bayes' rule is not applicable and condition D3 places no restrictions on posterior beliefs ( (¢j0)). In this case, player 2's expectation of how much she has been Lemma 1 summarizes, giving necessary and su¢cient conditions for a pair of strategies to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 A pair of strategies (~ ¤ ~ ¤ ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if:
Results
We will now consider the equilibria of the game: …rst, describing the case where player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0); then, turning to the case where player 2 feels there is a duty ( 2 = 1).
How much will player 2 punish noncompliance when player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0)? It follows from Lemma 1 that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Noncompliance is not punished (~ ¤ = 0) and player 1 complies only from a sense of duty (only if 1 = 1 and · ).
Proposition 1 If player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0), a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, player 2 does not punish noncompliance:
What drives the …nding that noncompliance is excused? Player 2 feels mistreated when she believes she has been harmed because player 1 lacks an appropriate sense of duty ( 1 2 ). In this case, either player 1 has a minimally appropriate sense of duty
( 1 = 2 = 0) or player 1 has a greater sense of duty to comply than player 2 thinks is required ( 1 = 1 2 = 0). Since noncompliance cannot be due to a lack of an appropriate sense of duty, player 2 will not feel mistreated when player 1 fails to comply.
Proposition 1 may seem trivial, but it has important implications. It says that, if player 2 feels player 1 has no duty to comply (is entitled to do what he wants), player 2 will not get angry when player 1 behaves in a self-interested way. It gives a rationale for self-interested behavior sometimes being acceptable and not provoking anger.
We turn now to the case where player 2 feels there is a duty to comply ( 2 = 1).
Proposition 2, stated below, considers the case in which player 2 believes = with probability and = ¸ with probability 1 ¡ . The special case in which = = ¹ corresponds to the illustrative example from Section 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose player 2 feels there is a duty to comply ( 2 = 1), and player 2 believes = 0 with probability and = ¸ with probability 1 ¡ (0 1). There are three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria that can arise. and + , an equilibrium does not exist. This is consistent with Lemma 2 (see below), since Lemma 2 does not ensure existence in this particular case.
Type 1: the reasonable type ( 1 = 1) always complies.
If
· + , PBE exist with:
0 otherwise Type 2: the reasonable type never complies.
, a PBE exists with:
Type 3: the reasonable type sometimes complies (when = ).
If
´ , a PBE exists with:
Three types of equilibria can arise. The behavior of the reasonable type ( 1 = 1) di¤ers across these equilibria. In an equilibrium of type (1), reasonable people always comply.
In an equilibrium of type (2), reasonable people never comply. In an equilibrium of type (3), reasonable people sometimes comply (when = ). Noncompliance is excused in a type (2) equilibrium since reasonable people do not comply. Noncompliance is punished in type (1) and type (3) equilibria since reasonable people do sometimes comply.
Let us begin by discussing the case where = = ¹ , corresponding to the illustrative example. Only equilibria of types (1) and (2) arise when = = ¹ .
The set of perfect Bayesian equilibria produce a picture nearly identical to Figure 1 . The only di¤erence is that a wider range of punishments are admissible in Region 1A:~ ¤ 2
[min( ) ] rather than~ ¤ = These equilibria do not survive an appropriate re…nement of PBE (see Appendix).
As in the illustrative example, the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria depends upon ´ . Punishment is greater: when player 2 considers it more likely the cost of compliance is low ( is greater); and when player 2 considers it more likely player 1 is unreasonable ( is lower).
Consider the reasons for these two results. In a type (3) equilibrium, unreasonable people ( 1 = 0) never comply and reasonable people ( 1 = 1) comply only when the cost of compliance is low ( = ). Hence, if player 2 observes noncompliance, there might be a good excuse -it might be due to a high cost of compliance ( = ) -but it is also possible that there is no good excuse ( = and 1 = 0). When player 2 considers it more likely that the cost of compliance is low ( is greater) or when player 2 considers it more likely player 1 is unreasonable ( is lower), player 2 puts less weight on there being a good excuse. Thus, player 2 gets angrier over noncompliance.
Proposition 2 suggests three observations. First, unreasonable people potentially comply in equilibrium -not just those with a sense of duty. When the cost of compliance is not too high ( · ), equilibria of type (1) exist in which noncompliance receives su¢cient punishment to induce compliance from unreasonable people with probability 1. This result
shows that anger has a distinct role in the model from duty, since it generates compliance from players who would not have complied out of a sense of duty. This property of the model may also be important for the persistence of compliance over time. While we take players' views about duty as exogenous throughout the paper, one might imagine that people's sense of duty to comply with rules would erode if those lacking a sense of duty were able to bene…t from breaking the rules.
Second, even when a sense of duty hardly motivates compliance at all ( is very low), it still may be possible to obtain compliance. In particular, if · , compliance (of both reasonable and unreasonable people) can be achieved for any value of 0. This result is somewhat surprising: even when duty hardly motivates compliance, it still may be su¢cient to generate anger over noncompliance and punishment of noncompliance. On the other hand, in order for player 2 to get angry over noncompliance, it is necessary that player 2 feel there is at least some duty to comply. As we saw in Proposition 1, when player 2 feels there is no duty to comply at all, the unique equilibrium is one in which player 2 excuses noncompliance.
Third, player 2 only gets angry with players whose views regarding duty di¤er from her own ( 1 6 = 2 types) or whose views player 2 suspects might di¤er. When = = ¹ , …rst players who hold the same views as the second player regarding duty ( 1 = 2 types) never provoke anger. First players who hold di¤erent views ( 1 6 = 2 types), on the other hand, sometimes do provoke anger: they fail to comply in equilibria of type (1) when ¹ and this angers player 2. When player 2 does not know the cost of compliance ( ), player 2 sometimes becomes angry because of suspected rather than actual di¤erences of opinion: in equilibria of type (3), 1 = 2 types fail to comply when = and this provokes anger. If player 2 knew that player 1 shared her view regarding duty, she would also know that player 1 had a good excuse ( = ); but she suspects player 2 may disagree about duty and lack a good excuse. The …nding that anger arises because of disagreement about duty or the suspicion of disagreement has implications for how we think about con ‡ict situations.
Equilibrium Existence
It follows from Proposition 1 that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium always exists when 2 = 0. When 2 = 1, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not always exist. However, the following lemma gives an existence condition.
Lemma 2 
Phenomena Explained by the Model
The model explains a large number of phenomena. First, we will discuss two important
and ubiquitous enforcement problems and show how the model accounts for them. They are not captured by existing models. We will then turn to two phenomena explained by the paper's theory of anger.
Legitimacy
By common de…nition, a rule is "legitimate" if there is a widespread feeling that there is a duty to comply. Rules lacking legitimacy are di¢cult -if not impossible -to enforce. The model explains why legitimacy is so important. When a rule completely lacks legitimacy (which corresponds to the case where 1 = 2 = 0 in the model), there are three e¤ects.
One e¤ect is that people will only comply to avoid punishment. A second e¤ect, which follows from Proposition 1, is that observers of noncompliance will excuse it (since 2 = 0).
A third e¤ect, consistent with the model but not directly captured by it, is that observers may fear retaliation if they report rule violations to authorities or punish violators directly.
The reason is that punishing noncompliance provokes anger when a rule lacks legitimacy:
because reasonable observers (de…ned by player 1 as 2 = 0 types, since 1 = 0) would be expected to excuse noncompliance. Lack-of-legitimacy thus presents a serious problem for the enforcement of rules.
Legitimacy is crucial in many di¤erent contexts. Legal scholars have identi…ed it as a key determinant of the ease or di¢culty of enforcing laws (see Tyler (1990) and Fagan and Meares (2008)). The di¢culty confronting the police in rooting out gang activity provides an illustrative example. The main problem of the police in the inner city is people's reluctance to report gang activity. Fagan and Meares (2008) point to illegitimacy of the law as the key reason. 30 In his classic study of gangs, Martin Sanchez Jankowski quotes one New York police o¢cer as follows: "When we get the community support, we go with it. It is so frustrating because there are some times when gang members commit a crime in the neighborhood, then we come by, but nobody is willing to help. They say they know nothing." 31 According to Sanchez Jankowski, gang survival depends upon such support from the community. He describes, for instance, the case of the Pink Eagles in New York.
Expansion of the gang's drug operations left them less time to patrol the neighborhood, with a resultant increase in robberies and assaults in the community. While the community was willing to excuse the gang's violations of the law, they were angered by the gang's failure to adequately protect the neighborhood. As a result, the community began cooperating with the police. Remarkably, in short order, the Pink Eagles dissolved as an organization.
Just as legitimacy plays a major role in the enforcement of the law, it also plays a critical role in the enforcement of rules in …rms. We see one example in Gouldner's study of the Oscar Center plant of the General Gypsum Company. Prior to the arrival of a new plant manager, the plant had "few rules. . . and fewer still that were strictly enforced." 32
The central o¢ce charged the new plant manager, Vincent Peele, with making reforms.
But, because of the previous lax regime, Peele's new rules were seen as illegitimate and he faced resistance at every turn. Consider Peele's unsuccessful attempt to enforce a rule against absenteeism. According to Gouldner: "Supervisors. . . did, at …rst, attempt to enforce this rule. Very shortly thereafter, however, they...declared that this rule just 3 0 A number of factors, in their view, contribute to the law's illegitimacy in these communities, such as racially disproportionate incarceration rates.
3 1 Sanchez Jankowski (1991), p. 256. 3 2 Gouldner (1954) , p. 51.
could not be enforced." 33 Supervisors could not ascertain whether those who took absences had good reasons for doing so -since coworkers were unwilling to report when they did not. In addition, when absenteeism was punished, workers became extremely angry (this is the third e¤ect of lack-of-legitimacy, mentioned above). When management decreed that those who took days o¤ without permission would be laid o¤ for an equal number of days, the rate of absenteeism did not fall -it rose. According to Gouldner, "when several workers had been penalized. . . others would deliberately take o¤ without excuses" as a form of retaliation. As a result, "the number of absentees in any team was greater than usual, and the team would be unable to function." 34
The need for legitimacy serves as a constraint, one which has been omitted from thirdparty enforcement models and principal-agent theory more generally. Gouldner describes how the General Gypsum Company came to recognize Peele's lack-of-legitimacy as a constraint. Because rules set by the central o¢ce had greater legitimacy than Peele's, the company decided to delegate less authority to him. The central o¢ce had not lost faith in Peele: instead, they recognized the value to Peele of being able to cite central o¢ce rules in motivating workers. The organizational form that resulted was highly centralized and bureaucratic.
Well-intended policies sometimes fail because of lack of appreciation of the constraints imposed by legitimacy. Ostrom (1990) gives, as an example, the e¤ects of forest nationalizations in Thailand, Niger, Nepal, and India intended to prevent overuse. According to standard third-party enforcement models (such as Becker (1968)), these measures should have been helpful since they set up a system of government policing of forest use where none had previously existed. However, contrary to this prediction, they exacerbated the problem. The respective governments were unable to police e¤ectively because villagers did not feel the government had a legitimate right to nationalize the forests. Furthermore, villages had had their own rules intended to protect their forest parcels from overuse. In ending villages' sense of ownership of their parcels, nationalization delegitimized these village rules -thereby aborting the only e¤ective form of policing that had been taking place.
Noncompliance traps
When rules lack legitimacy, observers of noncompliance excuse it, making enforcement di¢cult. Observers may also excuse noncompliance simply because the rate of noncompliance is high. This leads to the possibility of a "noncompliance trap": a high rate of noncompliance makes enforcement di¢cult; the di¢culty of enforcing compliance sustains a high rate of noncompliance.
Collier (2000) has argued that pervasive corruption is di¢cult to …ght for just such a reason. In an honest society, a corrupt act "gives rise to a stronger sense of indignation. . . Indignation is the trigger for disclosure, and so if a corrupt act is detected, it is much more likely to be reported to the authorities." There is at least a scattering of evidence in support of Collier's story. In surveys, for example, people justify their own corrupt behavior by citing its pervasiveness (see Rose-Ackerman (2001)).
The model captures Collier's story. 35 Recall from Proposition 2 and the illustrative example that, when the cost of compliance takes an intermediate value, there are multiple equilibria: one type with a high rate of compliance and anger over noncompliance, and another type with a low rate of compliance and no anger over noncompliance. An honest society might correspond to the former type of equilibrium and a corrupt society might correspond to the latter type. In the corrupt society, because everyone engages in corruption (including reasonable people), corruption fails to provoke anger and is not punished. The lack of punishment sustains the high rate of corruption. In an honest society, reasonable people behave honestly, which means that corrupt acts provoke anger and are punished.
This punishment sustains the low rate of corruption. 36 The model suggests a reason why underdeveloped countries would be especially prone to corruption traps. They may initially lack laws against corruption; and, insofar as laws do exist, they may lack e¤ective organizations to enforce them. In terms of the model, this corresponds to a low (low ability to punish noncompliance). 37 According to Proposition 2 and the illustrative example, if is su¢ciently low, there will be a unique equilibrium, with high corruption. In due course, developing countries may create laws and authorities to enforce them, which increases . With a higher , there may be multiple equilibria: both a high-corruption equilibrium and a low-corruption equilibrium. While the model is not dynamic, we might expect past corruption and past tolerance of corruption to lead to its persistence even after increases.
To escape from such a trap, the sense that corruption is "reasonable" must be erased; this can only be accomplished through a "big push" against corruption. Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2012) argue that, historically, dramatic, persistent declines in corruption have generally coincided with big push e¤orts. Examples include the United States, Sweden, and Denmark, in the nineteenth century, and Hong Kong and Singapore, more recently.
Corruption is just one example of a "noncompliance trap" associated with underdevelopment. For example, there are also literatures documenting the persistence -and tolerationof tax avoidance, teacher/health-worker absenteeism, and unpunctuality in underdeveloped countries. 38 the model for corrupt societies. For example, winning a government contract without paying a bribe might be possible for a …rm in an honest society but impossible in a corrupt society. According to Proposition 2 and the illustrative example, there might be a unique equilibrium in corrupt societies (with high ) in which people engage in corruption (fail to comply) and corrupt acts fail to provoke anger; in contrast, there might be a unique equilibrium in honest societies (with low ) in which people behave honestly (comply) and corrupt acts provoke anger.
Tolerance of self-interestedness in markets
We turn now to a phenomenon captured by the paper's theory of anger. The model explains why there is a high degree of tolerance of self-interestedness in markets; it also explains the exceptions.
Adam Smith saw self-interestedness as a principal characteristic of markets: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." 39 According to Sen (1977) , people do not universally behave self-interestedly: so this feature of markets requires explanation.
Despite the high degree of tolerance of self-interestedness in markets, the previously mentioned survey of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) has identi…ed exceptions.
Two examples illustrate. 82 percent of respondents considered it unfair for a hardware store to increase the price of snow shovels from $15 to $20 the morning after a snowstorm.
77 percent thought it unfair for a small company to decrease workers' wages by 5 percent when the company was making a pro…t but high unemployment made it easy to replace current employees with new workers at a lower wage.
The model accounts for tolerance of self-interested behavior in markets in two distinct ways. First, there tends to be a feeling of entitlement in markets to pursue self-interest:
that is, there is no duty to do otherwise ( 1 = 2 = 0). According to Proposition 1, when 1 = 2 = 0, player 1 will pursue self-interest (choose = 0) and this will be tolerated by player 2. A second reason may also be at work. According to Proposition 2 (and the illustrative example of Section 2), when the cost of compliance is high, player 1 will act according to self-interest and player 2 will not get angry. The cost of compliance is often high in markets. For example, in perfectly competitive markets, …rms that set prices below the market price make losses and are driven out of business. Hence, even if market participants feel that there is a duty to keep prices low, they may still excuse a …rm for charging the market price, since the cost of doing otherwise is so high. Schotter, Weiss, and Zapater (1996) have provided experimental evidence in support of this idea. In their experiment, subjects played an ultimatum game. Those subjects assigned to the …rst-player role moved on to a second stage, where there was an opportunity to earn more, if their earnings in the …rst stage were in the top half of the distribution. Schotter, Weiss, and
Zapater found that such competition to move on to the second stage made second players more excusing of low o¤ers in the …rst round.
The model also accounts for the exceptions to tolerance of self-interestedness identi…ed by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) . All of the cases in which they …nd such lack of tolerance have a common feature: one or both of the market participants possess market power. For instance, the hardware store is clearly exercising its market power if it raises the price of snow shovels after a snowstorm. It therefore appears that, while market participants normally feel entitled to pursue self-interest ( 1 = 2 = 0), when there is market power they feel there is a duty not to abuse it.
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler sketched their own model to account for their …ndings.
They say that people do not get angry so long as the gains resulting from a transaction are shared (where gains are de…ned relative to a reference point). Since only gains need to be shared, the model accounts for some of the tolerance of self-interestedness we see.
For example, it explains why the failure of the rich to give away most of their wealth does not necessarily provoke anger. But their model fails to account for competitive market situations (as in the stock market), where there is tolerance of the self-interested pursuit of gain. In contrast, our model, which is quite di¤erent from theirs, explains such situations comfortably.
Graduated Sanctions
We turn to a second phenomenon explained by the paper's theory of anger. The model accounts for Ostrom's observation that sanctions generally escalate for repeat o¤enders.
Such escalation of punishment is a common feature of the law: according to Roberts (1997) , "for as long as countries have had formal legal systems. . . recidivists have been seen as deserving harsher punishments than crimes by …rst o¤enders." 40
One explanation for graduated sanctions is suggested by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) , who show that they can be optimal in a principal-agent setting. In their model, some agents maximize social welfare, while others have a desire to violate rules when it is not socially optimal. The principal uses graduated sanctions because they permit occasional noncompliance from agents who are appropriately motivated (as is optimal) while still keeping in check those who are not. 41 While Polinsky and Rubinfeld provide one reason for escalating punishment, it has often been suggested that a key reason is that anger is greater when there is a past history of noncompliance. According to Fletcher (1982) , "Retributivists hold that, whatever the social utility or disutility of punishment, the recidivist deserves greater punishment." 42 Durham (1987) The model explains Durham's statement. According to Proposition 2, there is more anger over noncompliance when player 2 is more convinced player 1 is unreasonable. A past history of rule violation generally signals that someone is unreasonable. In particular, in a …nitely-repeated version of the punishment-compliance game in which player 1's cost of compliance ( ) is redrawn each round, a past history of rule violation signals that player 4 0 In the United States, most states have statutes requiring enhanced punishment for o¤enders with repeat convictions (see Proband (1994) ). California and several other states have enacted "three strikes" laws, which require life sentences for a third serious criminal o¤ense. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a life sentence for a third (and minor) property o¤ense in Rummel v. Estelle (see Davis (1992) for a discussion). There is also strong public support for graduated sanctions. In a survey conducted in Missouri, for example, Fichter and Veneziano (1988) found that the percentage of respondents favoring a state prison sentence for an individual who committed a burglary rose from 12 percent on the …rst o¤ense to 60 percent on the third. Judge William Wilkins, who chaired the United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission, noted that "enhancing a defendant's sentence on the basis of criminal history...is consistent with public perceptions of crime seriousness." (Wilkins (1992) , p. 577).
4 1 Abreu, Bernheim, and Dixit (2005) …nd that graduated sanctions can be optimal even if it is never socially optimal for agents to break the rule. Like Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) , they assume asymmetric information about the agent's cost of compliance. But, they further assume imperfect monitoring of agents, so that an agent suspected of noncompliance may or may not be guilty. Harsh punishment is not meted out for …rst o¤enses because of the possibility of type II error.
is unreasonable. 44 45
Ostrom cites Glick's (1970) study of the ancient huerta irrigation system of Valencia as an example where the cost of compliance was redrawn in this manner. There was a set rotation order for the receipt of water. A farmer was permitted to draw as much water as needed on his turn, but none at other times. According to Ostrom, "from time to time, the cost to a farmer of waiting for his next legal turn to receive water, as contrasted to stealing water available in the canal, would be extraordinarily high." 46 In other words, while most of the time, the cost of compliance ( ) was low, occasionally it was extremely high and hence there was a good excuse for taking water. For farmers who stole only in these rare instances, the "monetary …ne...would be quite low." 47 While the perfect experiment has not yet been run, Kliemann, Young, Scholz, and Saxe (2008) provide suggestive evidence that anger escalates with repeated noncompliance. In their experiment, subjects played two rounds of a trust game with an anonymous opponent. 48 Subjects were then presented with a vignette regarding the opponent. They were told that he had found a neighbor's sweater in his building's washing machine; he moved the sweater to the dryer; and it shrunk four sizes. Subjects assigned greater blame when the opponent had previously failed to reciprocate in the trust game. 49 
Conclusion
This paper elaborates a theory of rule enforcement where people are angered by violations of rules. Corresponding to the standard de…nition of negligence in the law, noncompliance provokes anger in the model when a "reasonable person" would have complied under similar circumstances.
The model illuminates the circumstances in which rules will be enforceable. It is unique in identifying the "legitimacy" of rules as a determinant of enforceability. While there is a large literature on legitimacy outside of economics, within economics, it has been all-butunexplored. The model suggests that rules are also di¢cult to enforce when the rate of noncompliance is high. Collier (2000) has argued that pervasive corruption is hard to …ght for exactly this reason. This leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria in the model: one equilibrium in which noncompliance is tolerated and there is a low rate of compliance, and another in which noncompliance provokes anger and there is a high rate of compliance.
The model also yields a theory of anger. This theory accounts for the high degree of tolerance of self-interestedness in markets (as well as the exceptions to such tolerance identi…ed by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) ). The model also explains why anger and punishment normally escalate with repeat o¤ense.
The paper contributes to several areas of research such as the work on norms and rule enforcement discussed in the introduction. Since players potentially feel mistreated (unfairly treated) in the model, it also relates to work on fairness. In contrast to existing fairness models, in which there is a …xed notion of what constitutes fair treatment, what is considered fair here varies depending upon players' views regarding duty (or, put another way, varies with the norms). This allows the model to account for contextual di¤erences in fairness attitudes, such as the particularly high tolerance of self-interested behavior in markets. There is, however, overlap with existing models. In their survey article, Fehr and Schmidt (2006) distinguish two types of reciprocity models of fairness: "intention-based models" and "interdependent-preference models." 50 Our model is a hybrid, and it addresses respective concerns: for example, in intention-based models, a high cost of providing a bene…t to others does not excuse the failure to do so; in interdependent-preference models, those known to be sel…sh are punished even when they behave just like unsel…sh types. 51 52
The paper suggests many directions for future research -especially with regard to …rms and other organizations. It suggests the possibility of welfare-destroying con ‡ict caused by di¤ering views of duty. How do organizations mitigate internal con ‡ict? Within organizations, there are not only rules as to how people should behave but also rules concerning who should punish misbehavior and to what extent. Can such "institutionalization" of punishment increase its provision? Furthermore, rule violators might be angered if they are punished and retaliate. When does the threat of such retaliation prevent observers from reporting noncompliance to authorities? 53 The paper especially raises two important issues. The need to legitimate rules serves as a constraint on the kinds of rules that can be enforced. This constraint is absent from existing third-party enforcement models and principal-agent theory more generally. How do such constraints a¤ect the way in which organizations are structured? (One example -surely just the tip of an iceberg -is the bureaucracy that arose in the General Gypsum Company because the plant manager lacked legitimacy.) Second, our discussion of markets implies that fairness attitudes di¤er from those within …rms; what are the consequences for they believe opponents intend to treat them kindly (hostilely). In "interdependent-preference models," there are two types: sel…sh players are always sel…sh, while altruistic players are kind when they believe their opponents are altruistic and sel…sh when they believe their opponents are sel…sh.
5 1 In interdependent-preference models, those known to be sel…sh are punished even when they behave the same way as others because punishment is meted out solely by type. In contrast, in the model developed in this paper, unreasonable people may avoid punishment by behaving as a reasonable person would behave. 5 2 Our model also addresses concerns with a third category of fairness model, in which players have "social preferences." In social preference models, players care about the material allocations both to themselves and to others. The theory of fairness described in this paper has some potential overlap: for example, players might consider it a duty to show concern for inequity. But "duty" is de…ned much more generally. Our model can also account for the many situations in which people tolerate self-interested behavior, since it need not be a duty to show concern for others. 5 3 The model also gives a framework for thinking about social change. Recent history is replete with examples of dramatic shifts in what is tolerated: discrimination (based on race, gender, and sexual orientation); divorce; children out-of-wedlock; skin exposure; language; child-rearing; the list goes on. The model suggests such social changes re ‡ect an altered conception of what is "reasonable." A change in what is considered reasonable might be the result of new ideas (a change in 1 and 2); it might also re ‡ect a shift from one equilibrium to another. Social change does not appear to be solely due to changes in ideas. In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, for example, tolerance of discrimination appears to have declined quickly while deep-seated attitudes about race changed at a slower pace (see Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) ). the theory of the …rm? The high tolerance of self-interestedness in markets suggests that a special property of markets is that outcomes are obtained with a minimum of contention.
For example, Adam Smith's butcher, brewer, and baker not only provide dinner; they do so without complaint. We might expect a di¤erent outcome if, instead, the butcher, brewer, and baker were employees within the same …rm. What are the implications for how activity should be distributed between …rms and markets?
7 Appendix (For Online Publication)
Reasonable-Person (RP) Stability
Our main focus in the paper is on perfect Bayesian equilibria. In Section 2's illustrative example, however, we used a di¤erent equilibrium concept because its conditions were easier to state. This equilibrium concept corresponds to a re…nement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To show the correspondence between the illustrative example and the formal model, we will now de…ne this re…nement. This re…nement eliminates only a few PBE. It generates the same compliance behavior as PBE, but PBE admits a larger set of possible punishments of noncompliance.
We will say that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is reasonable-person (RP) stable if player 2's beliefs about reasonable people are "stable" in the following sense. If player 2 is certain ex ante that reasonable players always comply, player 2 remains certain ex post. RP stability is de…ned more formally below. Note that RP stability is not a standard re…nement concept. It requires that player 2 hold stable beliefs about how reasonable people behave, where reasonableness is a concept particular to the game considered in this paper.
De…nition 2 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is reasonable-person (RP) stable if:
If player 2 expects noncompliance to arise with positive probability, so that Bayes' rule is applicable ( (~ ¤ ) 1), condition D4 is implied by condition D3. If, on the other hand, player 2 never expects to see noncompliance, so that Bayes' rule is not applicable, condition D4 places an additional restriction on player 2's posterior beliefs ( (¢j0)). It requires that player 2 believe, upon observing noncompliance, that reasonable types nonetheless always comply. Clearly, player 2 will feel mistreated in amount in such a circumstance, since she observed noncompliance but believes a reasonable person would have complied ( (¢j0) [ (~ ¤ 1 )] = ). It follows from condition (*) that noncompliance will receive punishment~ ¤ = . This is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is RP-stable if and only if:
The following are restatements of Propositions 1 and 2, which characterize the RP-stable equilibria in addition to the perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Proposition 1 (restatement) If player 2 feels there is no duty to comply ( 2 = 0), a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists and it is RP-stable. In this equilibrium, player 2 does not punish noncompliance:
Proposition 2 (restatement) Suppose player 2 feels there is a duty to comply ( 2 = 1), and player 2 believes = 0 with probability and = ¸ with probability 1 ¡ (0 1). There are three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria that can arise. 54 Type 1: the reasonable type ( 1 = 1) always complies.
If · + , PBE exist with:
is RP-stable. Type 2: the reasonable type never complies.
If , a PBE exists with:
0 otherwise This equilibrium is RP-stable. Type 3: the reasonable type sometimes complies (when = ). If
0 otherwise This equilibrium is RP-stable.
Observe that the RP-stable equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2 are nearly identical to the full set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. The only di¤erence is that, in Proposition 2, there is a unique RP-stable equilibrium of Type 2 while there are multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria. The RP-stable equilibria in Proposition 2 are identical to the equilibria in Figure 1 . As mentioned previously, the full set of perfect Bayesian equilibria produce a nearly identical picture. The only di¤erence relative to Figure 1 is that a wider range of punishments are admissible in Region 1A:~ ¤ 2 [min( ) ] From the restatement of Proposition 1, it follows that an RP-stable equilibrium always exists when 2 = 0. When 2 = 1, an RP-stable equilibrium does not always exist. However, Lemma 4 gives existence conditions (they are, in fact, the same existence conditions as those given for PBE in Lemma 2). and + , an equilibrium does not exist. This is consistent with Lemma 3 (see below), since Lemma 3 does not ensure existence in this particular case.
5 5 Condition (1) follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem. For a proof, see the Appendix. Condition (2) follows from Propositon 2.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Condition P1 is established in Section 3. Section 3 also discusses the case where 2 = 0. So, we will restrict attention to establishing conditions P2 and P3 for the case where 2 = 1.
First, let us consider when Bayes' rule is applicable. It will be applicable whenever = 0 arises with positive probability. Since, according to our restatement of condition D1, the 1 = 0 type is less compliant than the 1 = 1 type, = 0 with positive probability if and only if the 1 = 0 type chooses = 0 with positive probability. From our restatement of condition D1, we know that the 1 = 0 type chooses = 0 if~ ¤ . Thus Bayes' rule applies so long as (~ ¤ ) 1. Now, consider condition (*). It requires that:
If we apply our restatement of condition D1, it follows that:
When (~ ¤ ) = 1, Bayes' rule is not applicable so there are no restrictions on player 2's posterior beliefs ( (¢j0)). If 2 = 1, we can choose (¢j0) so that (f( 
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 2 follows immediately from Lemma 4, so it is su¢cient to prove Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. A proof of Lemma 3 is omitted, since it is given in the text.
Proof of Lemma 4. Existence is established in case (2) by Proposition 2. Therefore, we only need to establish existence in case (1). Let us consider the set of strategy pairs (~ ( 1 ) ~ ) with the properties that (1)~ ( 1 ) = ½ 1, if ·~ + ¢ 1 0 otherwise and (2)~ 2
[0 ]. We can index the members of this set by the value of~ . We will prove existence by showing that some strategy pair in this set satis…es the conditions P1 through P4. First, observe that condition P1 is trivially met for all members of the set. Since ( ) 1, (~ ) 1 for all~ in the set. Hence, condition P2 is applicable while conditions P3 and P4 are not. Observe that P2 holds if and only if~ = ¢ (~ ) = (0) 1 since is assumed to always be greater than zero. Hence, condition P2 is applicable while conditions P3 and P4 are not applicable. Condition P2 is clearly satis…ed. Lemma 3 also implies that the equilibrium is RP-stable, since condition P4 does not apply. This completes the proof. . We can index the members of this set by the value of~ . Lemma 1 implies that a PBE must be drawn from this set. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, one of the following must be true: (i) an 1 = 1 type always complies, (ii) an 1 = 1 type never complies, or (iii) an 1 = 1 type complies only when = . Consider case (i). If~ is a PBE of type (i), we must have ·~ + . First, suppose ·~ (we will refer to this as case (i)-A). This implies that (~ ) = 1, so condition P2 is not applicable but conditions P1, P3, and P4 are applicable. Condition P1 is clearly satis…ed for any strategy pair in the set. Condition P3 requires~ 2 [0 ] while condition P4 requires~ = . This proves that, if a PBE of type (i)-A exists, it must be a strategy pair with~ 2 [0 ] (and furthermore, if it exists, it will be RP-stable if~ = ). Existence requires that ·~ , or~ 2 [min( ) ]. Existence also requires ·~ + , or · + . Now consider case (i)-B, in which~ ·~ + . This implies (~ ) 1, so conditions P1 and P2 are applicable while P3 and P4 are not applicable. Condition P1 is clearly satis…ed for any strategy pair in the set. Condition P2 requires that~ = ¢ = . This proves that, if a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of type (i)-B exists, it must be the strategy pair with~ = (and furthermore, if it exists, it will be RP-stable). The strategy pair with~ = will indeed be an RP-stable PBE if · + . Combining cases (i)-A and (i)-B, we conclude~ 2 [min( ) ] will be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of type (i) if · + ; it will be RP-stable if~ = . Now, consider case (ii). If~ is a PBE of type (ii), we must have ~ + . This implies that ( +~ ) = (~ ) = 0. Hence, only conditions P1 and P2 of Lemma 1 are applicable. Condition P1 is clearly satis…ed for any strategy pair in the set. Condition P2 is met if:~ = ¢
[ ( +~ )¡ (~ )](1¡ )
[1¡ (~ )]¡ [ ( +~ )¡ (~ )] = 0. This proves that, if a PBE of type (ii) exists, it must be the strategy pair with~ = 0 (and furthermore, if it exists, it will be RP-stable). The strategy pair with~ = 0 will indeed be a PBE of type (ii) if ~ + , or . Finally, consider case (iii). If~ is a PBE of type (iii), we must have ·~ + . This implies that ( +~ ) = 1. Since (~ ) ( +~ ) 1, conditions P1 and P2 are applicable while conditions P3 and P4 are not. P1 is clearly satis…ed for any strategy pair in the set. Condition P2 requires that~ = ¢ . This proves that, if a PBE of type (iii) exists, it must be the strategy pair with~ = ¢ ¡ 1¡ (and furthermore, if it exists, it will be RP-stable). In order for this strategy pair to indeed be a PBE of type (iii) 
